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Background
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was instituted in 2002 because of major fraud scandals
throughout the U.S. Managers became responsible of ensuring the presence of adequate internal
controls and improving the accuracy and reliability of financial reporting and disclosures, which
would reduce the likelihood of and assign accountability to fraud (Keila et al. 2005, Kotsiantis et
al. 2006). External auditors are also required to report on the effectiveness of these internal
controls and evaluate management’s assessments of the controls.
With new technological advances, many common controls and paper documents that
were used to implement controls no longer exist. The role of an auditor is changing and needs to
adapt to the increasingly paperless business environment. Gone are the days where pre-numbered
documents helped account for the completeness of a transaction. Today, highly complex
computer software, called Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, takes care of
electronically sending, receiving, and storing this information.
Auditors need to be able to continuously monitor these complex ERP systems in order to
identify and prevent problems before they occur. The availability of massive quantities of data in
these new ERP systems also creates new opportunities for auditors. One of these opportunities is
improved methods to detect fraud. Whether it is fraudulent financial reporting or
misappropriation of assets, there are novel techniques being developed outside of accounting that
auditors could employ to assess the likelihood and risk of fraud.
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Objectives
Although much work has been done on text mining using the Enron Email Dataset (Keila
et al. 2005), this thesis will explore other and more diverse ways of utilizing current technology
to help auditors and the auditing profession improve the prevention and detection of fraud. The
objectives of this thesis are as follows:
1. To describe the current business environment; why are audits necessary?
2. To define fraud; why worry about fraud?
3. To describe how fraud can be detected: past, present, and in the future?

Current Business Environment
In the current business environment, almost every instance of financial fraud is
perpetrated with the use of a computer (Albrecht White Paper). The complexity that technology
has created in this environment puts more responsibility on the auditor to use all available
resources to ensure a thorough examination of accounting records (Byington et al. 2003). Hua et
al. (2008) explain that “the main contributing factors to the prevalence of fraud are the growing
complexity of organizations and systems, changes in business processes and activities, enormous
and ever-expanding volumes of transaction data, and outdated and ineffective internal controls.”
Audits of financial statements are a necessary “monitoring mechanism that helps reduce
information asymmetry and protect the interests of the principals, specifically, stockholders and
potential stockholders, by providing reasonable assurance that management’s financial
statements are free from material misstatements (Hunton et al. 2008).” Therefore it is critical for
a financial statement audit that the auditor use the most up to date resources available in order to
ensure the most effective and efficient audit.
5

What is fraud?
Accounting frauds can be categorized as being either fraudulent financial reporting,
misappropriation of assets, or both (Kotsiantis et al. 2006). The Treadway Commission defines
fraudulent financial reporting as intentional or reckless conduct, whether by act or omission, that
results in materially misleading financial statements. Misappropriation of assets occurs when
business assets and resources are not used for their intended purposes. Examples include
thievery, cash skimming and embezzlement (Kotsiantis et al. 2006). Another classification of
fraudulent financial reporting is management fraud which Kirkos et al. (2007) define as the
deliberate fraud committed by management that causes damage to investors and creditors
through material misleading financial statements.
The fraud triangle outlines three factors believed to be present in every fraud instance:
incentive, opportunity and attitude (Skillicorn et al. 2007). We can ask the following questions in
order to evaluate the environment using the fraud triangle:
How would an employee rationalize committing a fraud?
Does the culture of the organization promote ethical behavior?
Were there multiple occasions for an employee to commit fraud?
Was there an incentive that was presented?
Attitude refers to the integrity and the culture of the organization. It also involves “the
propensity of the individual to rationalize the fraud (Skillicorn et al. 2007).” Wilks et al. (2004)
note that opportunity results from “working conditions, including control deficiencies and/or
management override that result in circumstances allowing fraud to occur.” Incentive results
from “a perceived benefit from committing fraud such as accounting-based bonuses or stock
6

options (Skillicorn et al. 2007).” When an opportunity to commit fraud presents itself and there
is a large enough incentive, a fraud may still be perpetrated even if management’s integrity is
considered to be adequate.
Cullinan et al. (2006) explain that in a financial statement audit, there are three main
ways that auditors can detect fraudulent misstatements:
1. Through the client’s control system
2. Through the auditor’s effective use of analytical review
3. Through substantive testing of transactions and balances.
However, Kotsiantis et al. (2006) note that detecting management fraud is a difficult task when
using normal audit procedures since there is a shortage of knowledge concerning the
characteristics of management fraud. Additionally, Kotsiantis et al. (2006) explain that given its
infrequency, most auditors lack the experience necessary to detect fraud. Also, managers may
deliberately try to deceive auditors. All three of these factors make it necessary to explore new
and improved ways to detect and deter fraud in an organization.

Why worry about fraud?
Fraudulent financial reporting (FFR) has serious consequences for the organization and
for the public’s confidence in capital markets (Kotsiantis et al. 2006). The costs of fraud to US
businesses are estimated to be more than $400 billion each year (Kirkos et al. 2007).
Additionally, up to 6% of organizations’ revenues may be lost annually as a result of fraud and
abuse (Hua et al. 2008). This is even more worrisome because according to the results of
KPMG’s Fraud Survey of 2003, organizations are reporting more experiences of fraud than in
prior years (Hua et al. 2008).
7

Byington et al. (2003) state that although all levels of business are involved, the greatest
losses to fraud are found at the supervisory and executive level. This finding is confirmed in a
detailed review of the SEC’s accounting and auditing enforcement releases, which found that
“the preponderance of financial statement frauds are perpetrated by the very top levels of
management - generally the CEO or equivalent level (Cullinan et al. 2006).” The increased
reliance on control assessment and analytical review by auditors and audit processes opens the
possibility of more frauds being undetected, because of their focus on lower level employees,
rather than top managers (Cullinan et al. 2006).
There are also costs associated with misclassifying a fraudulent transaction as nonfraudulent. This is known as a Type II error. The costs that result from Type II errors are much
higher than Type I errors, which occur when a non-fraudulent transaction is classified as
fraudulent.
Because of the technology boom, it is argued that unintentional financial statement error
will diminish and that future demand for audits will “depend largely on their ability to detect or
deter fraud (Skillicorn et al. 2007).” SAS Nos. 53 (AICPA 1988), 82 (AICPA 1997), and 99
(AICPA 2002) contain extensive lists of fraud risk cues. Checklists from these standards have
been developed by auditors to ensure that each fraud risk cue is considered (Skillicorn et al.
2007). However, these checklists “fail to consider how management could manipulate the cues
on the checklists (Skillicorn et al. 2007).” This failure to consider management’s response
prevents auditors from designing procedures that management does not anticipate. Wilks et al.
(2004) also found that auditors who employ the fraud risk checklists are “less sensitive to fraud
than auditors who do not use checklists.”
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Hua et al. (2008) note that fraud “is composed of the following three categories:
intentional illegal act, the concealment of the act, and deriving a benefit from that act.” Because
fraudulent activities are usually well-planned and intentionally covered up, it is difficult for the
auditor to detect these incidents. Although fraud does not happen as often as misuse and error,
when it does occur, it usually represents a large amount that has been misstated.

Detecting Fraud
An audit can be designed to be done around the computer or through the computer.
Auditing around the computer doesn’t involve evaluating a client’s computer controls.
Documents are chosen at random and the auditor then verifies the resulting outputs of the system
with the inputs. Therefore, this process assures that the controls must be working properly and
effectively when outputs are correct. Before the integration of technology and the automation of
many corporate accounting systems, “the audit was usually designed to go around the computer,
but with increased use of technology, it has become necessary to audit through the computer
(Byington et al. 2003).” But, as a caution, an auditor must keep in mind “that the tool used to
detect illegal activities is the same tool used to commit many of the crimes (Byington et al.
2003).”
Auditing through the computer involves evaluating the existence and effectiveness of the
client’s controls. This method is designed to test the automatic controls present in complex IT
systems. In 2012 the latest version of COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and related
Technology), COBIT 5, was released by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association
(ISACA). COBIT 5 is a framework that lets managers connect control requirements, IT issues
and risks associated with the business.
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There are four techniques that can be used to audit through the computer, though test data
is used most often. (Figure 1.)
(1) Test data
(2) Parallel Simulation
(3) Integrated Test Facility
(4) Embedded audit module

Test data
Technique

Uses a set of hypothetical transactions to audit the programmed checks and program logic in both
transaction and nontransaction processing programs. The test data approach requires only a modest
investment in time to apply in practice and does not require an extensive background in information
technology.

Parallel
simulation

Attempts to simulate or duplicate the firm’s actual processing results. To employ this technique, the auditor
writes a computer program, using an audit software package, or using packaged accounting software, such as
BusinessWorks, Oracle Financials, PeopleSoft Financials, M.A.S. 90 Evolution2 and SAP R/3. The auditor’s
objective is to use the software to input the firms actual data for a past period and generate the same output as
the live production programs. The auditor’s simulated results and the actual processing results are compared,
and differences noted, investigated, and corrected.

Integrated
test facility
(ITF)

Enables test data to be continuously evaluated when transactions are processed by online systems. The auditor
creates fictitious situations, such as a bogus department completing purchasing requisitions or purchase orders
being sent to bogus vendors, and performs a wider variety of tests compared to the test data approach. The
implementation of ITF is time-consuming and costly, requiring a high-level of computer expertise.

Embedded
audit
module

Is a programmed module or segment that is inserted into an application program. Its purpose is to monitor and
to collect data based on transactions, particularly those processed by online computer-based systems. The data
are then used by the auditor in the tests of controls and the evaluation of control risk. The application of this
method requires the auditor to have a good working knowledge of computer technology, including computer
programming.

Figure 1. Techniques used to audit through the computer
Source: Cerullo et al. 2003

Hua et al. (2008) highlight that data analysis is critical as a means of allowing auditors to
“streamline audit processes, bring fraudulent activities to light before they result in critical
losses, minimized financial losses, and ensure compliance with business rules and external
regulatory requirements, such as SAS 410 and SOX .” In order to accomplish this, fraud
10

detection methods should use full populations whenever possible, and since full populations can
be voluminous, they almost always require computers and data mining techniques (Albrecht
White Paper). Thus, as Byington et al. (2003) point out, the computer is the most essential tool
an independent auditor can utilize for the detection of fraud. The discovery of the WorldCom
fraud is one example of “using computer technology to search full populations of data for
anomalies, trends, and fraud (Albrecht White Paper).”
Much exploratory research into new methods of combining publicly-available company
information could prove effective. Albrecht provides examples of publicly available external
information that may prove useful in future investigation of frauds:
(1) Incorporation records
(2) Property and other asset records
(3) Civil lawsuits
(4) Tax liens
(5) Civil judgment records
(6) Bankruptcy filings
(7) Home values, loans, neighbor contact information
(7) News articles or current events
This information may be valuable in determining if upper management is engaging in
questionable activities that might cause concern. Because Sarbanes-Oxley requires auditors to
assess the attitude present at the top levels of the organization, risky external behaviors could be
a red flag in an audit. In the end, research may show that financial statements are just too
summarized for effective data mining for fraud (Albrecht White Paper).
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ERP
Enterprise Resource Planning software has become a necessity in the current business
environment. This is because “the development and pervasive use of ERP systems provides the
critical infrastructure necessary for the effective evolution of the assurance function from a
periodic event to an ongoing process through the integration of continuous auditing applications
(Kuhn et al. 2010).” Bierstaker et al. (2001) found that more than 10,000 companies currently
use some form of enterprise computing platforms such as SAP R/3.
ERP and Continuous Monitoring
The complexity of US business structures and systems often makes it difficult to
eliminate errors from financial systems and to reduce employee misuse of assets or failure to
comply with policies (Hermanson et al. 2006). The control environments of businesses also
increase the applicability of continuous monitoring; if some employees or managers see that
errors go undetected, this can open the door to misuse of the company resources or simple
disregard for company policies. This makes it extremely difficult to oversee the actions of
thousands of employees on a daily basis.
Hermanson et al. (2006) found that continuous monitoring can significantly reduce fraud,
misuse, and errors. This can be achieved by using Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems
that provide companies with (1) much greater ability to process and manage information and (2)
much greater monitoring/auditing capacity. Even with this greater ability and greater capacity,
most companies have focused on the ability to process and manage more information, while
monitoring/auditing capacity has received less attention. As a result, many organizations have
large, unexplored databases that could yield important insights into the incidence of errors,
misuse and fraud (Hermanson et al. 2006). This is important because early detection and
12

understanding root causes of problems are critical to reducing fraud opportunities and preventing
losses of company assets (Hermanson et al. 2006).
Figure 2. shows a four component process for investigating possible fraud in the
organization which would be led by the internal audit function. During continuous monitoring,
alerts would be received by the internal audit team who would then determine if further
investigation is necessary. If a formal investigation is required the team would notify the
appropriate groups and then proceed to the Investigation Phase. This phase is comprised of
obtaining evidence, evaluating report findings and performing any administrative, legal or other
follow ups. An incident analysis would follow the formal investigation which would include
reviewing for any links to other fraud incidents and for any patterns in the fraud. Finally the team
would implement any corrective measures it found required. This process is necessary because of
the complexity of fraud incidents. Continuous monitoring also can lead to cost savings in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 arena (SOX 2002).
Continuous monitoring methodologies are increasingly viewed by internal audit as a
means to enhance their audit processes as well as to meet stakeholder needs and their demands
for faster and higher-quality real-time assurance (PWC 2006). In this role, continuous monitoring
is designed to identify errors and wrong-doing early in the transaction process.
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Figure 2. Response Process - Possible Fraud Process Flowchart
Source: Oversight Systems, Inc.

Behavioral Analysis
As mentioned earlier, fraud is composed of an intentional illegal act and the concealment
of that act. Kotsiantis et al. (2002) emphasize the fact that “unintentional nonfraudulent financial
statement errors are static in that their incidence is unaffected by the anticipated audit. But fraud
is intentional and strategic such that its incidence is affected by the anticipated audit.” Auditors
need to be mindful that most managers know what to expect and can plan for an upcoming audit.
When looking at email or any documented communication between employees, Keila et al.
(2005) point out that “awareness that some kind of surveillance may be in place may also
generate an excessive blandness in messages as their senders try to ensure that the messages do
not get flagged: this blandness may itself become a signature; it is also likely that messages
between coconspirators will have unusual content.” One method to fight fraud is to “pursue a
model that describes fraudulent behaviors, or, better, create mechanisms that distinguish
14

fraudulent from non-fraudulent behaviors (Almeida et al. 2009).” Among other methods, data
mining techniques can be used to explore behavioral analysis.

Data Mining
Data mining is a process that analyzes large populations of data and provides useful
feedback which can then be more easily interpreted by auditors. Data mining uses a set of
techniques that help to find and collect vital information that may lead to fraud detection
(Almeida et al. 2009). Almeida et al. (2009) note that the ultimate goal of applying data mining
to fraud detection is to create a classification model that can label a record, person or company as
being fraudulent or not. These methods could assist auditors in accomplishing the task of
management fraud detection because they have advanced classification and prediction
capabilities (Kirkos et al. 2007).
Data mining can be used to produce models of deceptive practices, fraud, or collusion
which assume that word usage changes to reflect factors such as: self-consciousness or guilt
about the deception; and simplified content to make consistent repetition easier and to reduce the
cognitive burden of generating a false ‘story’ (Keila et al. 2005). Keila et al. (2005) explain that
these models assume that deception leaves a linguistic signature, both because language
production is fundamentally a subconscious process, and so affected by emotional states
associated with deceiving; and “because the cognitive demands of deception cause performance
deficits in other areas.” Email communication can be used as data when analyzing an employee’s
linguistic signature.
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Email
Email correspondence in today’s business environment is arguably the most common
form of electronic evidence (Albrecht White Paper), but there are surprisingly few advanced
email technologies that take advantage of the large amount of information present in a user’s
inbox (Bekkerman et al. 2004). Email is an important vehicle for communication in most
companies, both among employees, and between employees and the outside world (Keila et al.
2005) and therefore is extremely affected by any emotional state that the sender is in during
composition.
In their research, Keila et al. (2005) analyzed the frequency of first-person pronouns,
exclusive words, negative emotion words, and action verbs in emails. Scarcer first-person
pronouns like I, me and my, were found to signify an attempted disassociation by the author
from their words. Fewer exclusive words like but, without, and except, could suggest the story is
fictitious because less of these words represent a less “cognitively complex story.” A less
cognitively complex, and thus fabricated story is also characterized by a greater occurrence of
action verbs. Because of the guilt subconsciously felt by the perpetrator, a deceptive email would
also likely contain a higher frequency of negative emotion words. Their approach ranked emails
by how likely they were to be deceiving.
Decision Trees
Kirkos et al. (2007) explain that a Decision Tree is a “tree structure, where each node
represents a test on an attribute, and each branch represents an outcome of the test.” The
structure is used to classify a previously unseen object by testing the attribute values of the object
against the splitting nodes of the Decision Tree. In their research the selected attribute values
were the Debt to Equity ratio, Sales to Total Assets, Sales minus Gross Margin, Earnings Before
16

Interest and Taxes, Working Capital, Altman’s Z score, Total Debt to Total Assets ratio, Net
Profit/ Total Assets, Working Capital/ Total Assets and Gross Profit/ Total Assets. They note
that the main advantages of Decision Trees are that they provide a meaningful way of
representing acquired knowledge and make it easy to extract IF-THEN classification rules. In
their research they found the accuracy rate of the Decision Tree model in correctly classifying
fraudulent financial statements to be 73.6%.
Neural Networks
Neural Networks is a system that can be used to assist auditors detect fraud. The system
consists of numerous neurons or as Kirkos et al. (2007) explain “interconnected processing
units”. Each connection is associated with a numerical value, called a “weight”. These weights
are totaled after each neuron receives signals from other connected neurons. The neuron fires if
the collective input signal strength exceeds a threshold. The main advantages of Neural
Networks are that they “make no assumptions about attributes’ independence, they are capable of
handling noisy or inconsistent data, and they are a suitable alternative for problems where an
algorithmic solution is not applicable.” Kirkos et al. (2007) found the accuracy rate of Neural
Networks in correctly classifying fraudulent financial statement to be 80%.
Bayesian Belief Networks
Bayesian Belief Networks is a technology that can also be applied to detect fraud. The
technology is based on Bayes Law which states that probability measures a degree of belief.
Kirkos et al. (2007) explain that Bayesian Belief Networks allow for the representation of
dependencies among subsets of attributes. In their research, Kirkos et al. (2007) found Bayesian
Belief Networks to be the most accurate in correctly classifying fraudulent financial statements
with a rate of 90.3%.
17

Digital Analysis
Benford’s Law
Benford’s Law states that in the lists of numbers obtained from natural, real-life data
sources, the distribution of the leading digit will follow a long-tail distribution (Hua et al. 2008).
Using a mathematical formula, Benford’s Law predicts that amounts will start with the digit 1
more often than the digit 9. Despite its limitations, Benford’s Law remains one of the most
popular data mining techniques for fraud (Albrecht White Paper). This is mainly because (1) in
most cases, it can be run on data without regard to context, and (2) analysis using Benford’s Law
does not require extensive training in math, which makes it simple enough to be described to and
used by almost anyone (Albrecht White Paper). By comparing, for example, sales data, against a
Benford’s distribution, an auditor can easily see if the number frequency matches that of the
Benford’s model. If there are anomalies within the data, the auditor can flag these entries for a
follow-up investigation.
Zipf’s Law
Hua et al. (2008) explain that the basic concept of Zipf’s Law is that the frequency of
word occurrence in an article furnishes a useful measurement and therefore the management of
word significance. This means that a small number of words can categorize a document’s
content. Zipf’s Law differs from Benford’s Law in that it can verify diverse attributes other than
numeric attributes (See Figure 3.). This allows auditors to filter any potential fraud records or
entries, which have abnormal frequency pattern (Hua et al. 2008). Hua et al. (2008) note that the
main purpose of Zipf’s analyis is to assist auditors for reviewing and identifying any potential
fraud records. Figure 4. depicts the process for detecting fraud using Zipf Analysis. In their
research, Hua et al. (2008) found that using Zipf’s analysis was more effective and efficient than
100% sampling.
18

Benford’s Law

Zipf’s Law
They are both derived from Nature Laws
They can be used to handle disaggregated account level data.
They both follow the principle of Power Law
Shows the relationship between digit and
Shows relationship between rank and
frequency.
frequency.
Numeric attributes are required
No pre-requirements defined for type of
attributes.
Applied for fraud detection already
Under review as potential tool for fraud
detection
Figure 3. Comparison between Benford's Law and Zipf's Law
Source: Hua et. al. 2008

Operational
Database

Zipf’s Frequency
Distribution
Patterns
Generation

Comparison

Anomalies
Detection

Actual Frequency
Distribution
Figure 4. Zipf Analysis for Fraud Detection
Source: Hua et al. 2008

Interpretation &
Evaluation

XBRL
XBRL, eXtensible Business Reporting Language, is “a language for the electronic
communication of business and financial data which is set to revolutionize business reporting
around the world (aicpa.org).” The mandatory filing of XBRL documents for business reporting
was phased in starting in 2009 but, organizations who had voluntarily adopted XBRL for their
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filings found the cost, time and technical proficiency thresholds to the adoption to be relatively
low (Gray et al. 2009). The adoption of XBRL, according to Grey et al., for internal financial
data affords opportunity to lower corporate risk, increase efficiency and transparency and better
serve stakeholders and the marketplace (Gray et al. 2009).
XBRL increases efficiency and effectiveness because data in this format is retrieved more
easily and can be analyzed with greater accuracy (Skillicorn et al. 2007). See Figure 5. for an
overview of XBRL structure and format. Because data can be retrieved more easily and with
greater accuracy, data analysis for fraud detection and prevention of fraud using data in the form
of XBRL is more effective and efficient. Also, Grey et al. (2009) note that there are two
important aspects of XBRL (1) its potential to function as a means to exchange data between
applications and (2) its map-once-use-many functionality, this is evidenced in that some of the
specialized auditing tools, such as ACL and IDEA, are now capable of working directly with
XBRL data.

Social Networks
Every organization is built on its relationships between other organizations and the
people in the organization themselves. Therefore, it is important to look at the social network of
each organization (Almeida et al. 2009). The analysis of social networks within fraudulent
organizations and its people can be extremely important when searching for fraud (Almeida et al.
2009). Social network research has been conducted on Usenet data, in which the “goal is to
characterize a dynamic online community as well as determine the “authority” of an individual
based on posting patterns.” (Bekkerman et al. 2004)
By using Conditional Random Fields (CRFs) an auditor can calculate the “conditional
probability of values on designated output nodes given values on designated input nodes.” CRFs
20

can be roughly explained as “conditionally-trained hidden Markov models, with additional
flexibility to effectively take advantage of complex overlapping features.” (Bekkerman et al.
2004) The system, as Bekkerman et al. (2004) explain, “obtains social links by extracting
mentions of people from Web pages and creating a link between the owner of the pages and the
extracted person.” In today’s socially booming environment, online (public) communities have
voluminous amounts of data that could be used in the auditing profession.

Figure 5. XBRL
Source: ifrs.org

Conclusion
The audit environment today is one of increased responsibility and workload for audit
teams, “including enhanced responsibilities for detecting fraud required by SAS No. 99 (AICPA
2002) and internal control attestation now required under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
21

Act.” (Curtis et al. 2008) But, if traditional methods of testing controls continue to be used,
significant risks may go unnoticed. Bierstaker et al. (2001) note that when dealing with advanced
information systems, the auditor may not be able to reduce detection risk to an acceptable level
by relying solely on substantive tests. This is why the inclusion of new techniques and up to date
resources in an audit is necessary for the efficiency and effectiveness of the final audit, especially
for the prevention and detection of fraud.
In the future, the focus of the audit will shift from manual detection to technology-based
prevention (Bierstaker et al. 2001). The role of an auditor is changing rapidly, and the use of
technology-based audit tools is the only way for the auditor to ensure an effective audit.
Technology is essential for auditors to understand the client’s business processes and “contend
with the paperless audit environment.” (Bierstaker et al. 2001)
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